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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

WILLIAM DONALD CARTER,
Defendant/Appellant.

CaseNo.20040637-CA

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a conviction of reckless endangerment, a third degree
felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112 (West 2004), in the Third Judicial District, Salt
Lake County, the Honorable Ann Boy den presiding.1 This Court has jurisdiction over the
appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004).
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendant was angry with his domestic partner. Two or three times, he
accelerated his truck towards her and then slammed on the brakes at the last moment,
each time stopping only inches away from her. Was evidence of this conduct sufficient
to support a jury verdict that defendant was aware of, but consciously disregarded,

This brief will cite to the current version of the Utah Code when there have been
no amendments relevant to defendant's claims.

a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct could cause death or serious
injury?
Standard of Review. This Court "will reverse a jury verdict only when, after
viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the
verdict/5 the Court "find[s] that the evidence to support the verdict was completely
lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable
and unjust." State v. McDonald, 2005 UT App 86, \ 8,

P.3d

(internal quotation

marks and citation omitted).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with reckless endangerment, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112. R2. Because defendant had previously been convicted of a
domestic violence offense, the offense was enhanced to a third degree felony. Id.; see
also Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-1.1 (West 2004).
Trial was held. R66. After the State rested at trial, defendant moved to dismiss on
the ground that the evidence was insufficient to show recklessness. R66, 131:182. The
court denied the motion. R66, 131:184. Defendant then testified. See R.67, 131:186206.
The jury found defendant guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to an
indeterminate prison term not to exceed five years. R68, 109-11. The court suspended
the prison term, placed defendant on probation for 36 months, and ordered defendant to
serve 120 days in jail. R109-11.
Defendant timely appealed. Rl 12.
2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant and Annett ("Annie") Baker had been living together for about eight
months. R131:127-28. Annie was working two jobs, but defendant was unemployed.
Id. at 197. Annie usually asked defendant to drive her to work. Id. at 129.
On November 30, 2004, Annie awakened defendant in the early afternoon to ask
him for a ride. Id. at 130. Defendant was angry because Annie had awakened him. Id.
He was also angry about having to drive Annie to work. Id. at 131. He and Annie argued
as they were driving. Id. When they were about twenty blocks from Annie's work,
defendant pulled off the road and told Annie "to get the hell out." Id. at 132. Annie got
out. Id.
Annie began walking north along the east side of Redwood Road. Id. at 133-34.
Defendant followed "really close" in his truck, "telling [Annie] to get back in the car."
Id. at 133. He was "[s]creaming at [her], pulling up behind [her], pulling at the side of
[her], telling [her] to get back in the car." Id. at 134. "He would say, Get in the car,
bitch, I'll take you to work." Id. at 140.
Defendant repeatedly sped up behind Annie so fast that "he'd have to slam on his
breaks before he hit [her]." Id. at 138. He came close enough so that he could "clip [her]
if he wanted to." Id. at 137. When he "slam[med] on his brakes," he would "slide a little
bit" on the gravel shoulder. Id. at 138. Annie could hear the rocks and dirt flying. Id.
At least two or three times, defendant's truck stopped no more than eight to twelve inches
from her. Id. at 138-39.
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Defendant followed her from about 20 South to 13 South, screaming and yelling
the entire time. Id. at 141. Annie was frightened, "ducking behind telephone poles and
stuff like that, because [she] thought he was trying to hit [her]." Id. at 139. Defendant
had previously made threats about his driving and things he would do. Id. at 144. He
had threatened to drive their vehicle "into a telephone pole and take [them] both out." Id.
This day defendant had threatened, "[0]ne of us [i]s going to get hurt." Id.
Moreover, defendant was driving a truck that was not working properly. Annie
said the truck was idling high. Id. Defendant said the truck had an "accelerator
problem." Id. at 195. He said that the "throttle got stuck" as he was driving Annie to
work. Id. at 189. He had to pull over and turn off the key. Id. The problems continued.
The truck "would start moving really quickly" when defendant would start it up. Id. at
190. He could smooth it out when he got it into second gear, but he "[h]ad to turn the key
off to stop it. Id. at 190, 195.
After defendant had followed Annie to about 13 South, he pulled over to the side
of the road and got out. Id. at 141. Annie, who was carrying a cell phone, had threatened
to call the police if defendant did not leave her alone. Id. Defendant pulled Annie's hair
as he grabbed the phone out of her backpack. Id. at 142. Defendant then returned to his
truck, made a U-turn, and "headed off." Id. at 143.
Annie continued walking to work. Id. at 164. Officers Boston and Webb found
her at 1050 South Redwood Road. Id. An unidentified person had called the police to
report "that a female was being chased by a male in a vehicle as she was walking down
Redwood Road." Id. at 164, 166. Officer Boston talked with Annie, wrote up a report,
4

and gave Annie a ride to work. Id, at 165. Annie was "very concerned" about being late
for work. Id. at 166.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The evidence sufficed to support defendant's conviction for reckless
endangerment. Specifically, defendant's abusive language, his jackrabbit stops and starts
on the road's gravel shoulder, his coming within inches of Annie after slamming on the
brakes, his knowledge that the car was working improperly, and his prior and concurrent
threats to use the vehicle to hurt her all supported the jury's determination that defendant
acted recklessly. The evidence supported the jury's verdict that defendant was aware that
his conduct could seriously injure or kill Annie, but that he consciously disregarded the
risk because he was angry and wanted to intimidate and punish her. The jury also
properly concluded that the risk here—the use of an automobile as a projectile against an
unprotected pedestrian—constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that an
ordinary person in defendant's circumstances would have exercised.
ARGUMENT
THE EVIDENCE SUFFICED TO SUPPORT A VERDICT THAT
DEFENDANT ACTED RECKLESSLY
Defendant claims that the State "failed to establish the mens rea of criminal
recklessness," "an element of the offense." Br. Appellant at 5, 15. He claims that he "did
not perceive his conduct to be a risk." Id. at 24. He contends that he had his truck under
control and therefore "had no reason to perceive any risk to [Annie] when he drove up to
her several times and stopped behind her." Id. at 19. Also, "[t]o the extent [he] should
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have been aware of a substantial risk . . . he was not." Id. at 24. Thus, he claims, the
evidence did not suffice to support the conviction. Id. at 6.
Defendant "must overcome a heavy burden in challenging the sufficiency of
evidence for a jury verdict." State v. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, ^ 10, 2 P.3d 954.
This Court "will reverse a jury verdict only when, after viewing the evidence and all
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict," the Court "find[s]
that the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and
unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." State v.
McDonald, 2005 UT App 86, f 8,

P.3d

(internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).
A.

A person acts recklessly when he is aware of, but consciously disregards, a
substantial and unjustifiable risk.
"A person commits reckless endangerment if... the person recklessly engages in

conduct that creates a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person."
Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-112(1) (West 2004).
A person acts recklessly "with respect to circumstances surrounding his
conduct.. . when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the circumstances exist." Utah Code Annotated § 76-2-103(3) (West 2004).
"The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint." Id.
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This Court has stated that "[determining whether a person acts recklessly under
this definition 'presents a conjecture-laden inquiry, involving both objective and
subjective elements.5" State v. Robinson, 2003 UT App 1, \ 6, 63 P.3d 105 (quoting
State v. Singer, 815 P.2d 13035 1307 (Utah App. 1991)). The subjective inquiries are
"whether the person actually perceived the risk that his or her actions presented and
whether he or she consciously disregarded it." Id. (citing State v. Howard, 597 P.2d 878,
881 (Utah 1979)) (emphasis in original). These are questions of the "subjective intent in
the mind of the actor." Howard, 597 P.2d at 881. A jury may rely on circumstantial
evidence in determining these questions: "A person's state of mind is not always
susceptible of proof by direct and positive evidence, and, if not, may ordinarily be
inferred from acts, conduct, statements or circumstances." State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT
App 289, Tj 10, 988 P.2d 949 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The objective inquiry is "the magnitude of the risk itself." Robinson, 2003 UT
App 1 at K 6 (citing State v. Wessendorf, 111 P.2d 523, 526 (Utah App. 1989). Is the risk
"'of such a degree that an ordinary person would not disregard . . . it'"? Id. (quoting
State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142, 148 (Utah 1983)).
B.

The evidence sufficed to support the jury verdict that defendant actually
perceived the risk that his conduct could cause death or serious bodily injury
and that he consciously disregarded it
Here, the evidence more than sufficed to support the jury's determination that

defendant actually perceived the risk that his conduct could cause death or serious bodily
injury and that he consciously disregarded it. Defendant repeatedly made jackrabbit
starts and stops of his truck, speeding up close to Annie before slamming on his brakes.
7

R131:133-39. At least twice defendant came within a few inches of striking her. Id. at
138-39. Defendant was angry at the time and repeatedly ordered Annie back into the car.
Id. at 134, 140. He used abusive language throughout the confrontation. Id. at 140.
Defendant's belligerent and aggressive driving made Annie jump behind obstacles like
telephone poles to protect herself. Id. at 139. From these circumstances the jury could
and did reasonably infer that defendant was aware of the risk that his driving could
seriously injure or kill Annie and that he consciously disregarded it.
Moreover, not only did defendant drive the truck at a speed so high that, slamming
on his brakes, he missed Annie by only inches, but he did it in a car that he knew to be
malfunctioning—a car that could only be stopped by turning off the key. Id. at 189-90,
195. Defendant's own testimony showed that he understood a good deal about auto
mechanics in general and about the "stuck accelerator" in particular. Id. at 189-195.
Further, when accelerating, aiming at Annie, and braking just before impact,
defendant was driving on the road's gravel shoulder where the surface is especially
slippery and where skidding is likely. Annie testified, "He [would] slide a little bit,
because it was gravel and dirt." Id. at 138. "[W]hen he'd slam on the brakes," she could
"hear the rocks and the dirt... flying." Id.
Finally, defendant had made specific prior threats to harm Annie with his truck.
He told Annie on a prior occasion that he would drive his truck "into a telephone pole
and take [them] both out." Id. at 144. On the day of the incident, he said to her, "[0]ne
of us [i]s going to get hurt." Id. These additional facts further support the jury's finding
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that defendant was aware of, but consciously disregarded the risk he caused when he
approached Annie rapidly with the truck, then slammed on the brakes.
In sum, a reasonable jury could readily infer from the evidence that defendant was
not only aware of the risk, but that he consciously disregarded it because he was angry
and wanted to intimidate and frighten Annie. Further, while defendant claimed below
that he did not perceive the risk, the jury was entitled assess his credibility and to
determine that his claim was not truthful. See State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah
App. 1996) ("stating "that determinations regarding witness credibility are solely within
the jury's province"). The jury chose not to credit defendant's claim that he believed
himself to be so completely in control of his truck that he did not perceive any risk.
Thus, the State produced evidence of acts, conduct, statements, and circumstances
that supported a reasonable inference that defendant did, in fact, perceive the risk, but
consciously disregarded it.
C.

The evidence sufficed to support the jury verdict that defendant's conduct
constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary
person would exercise.
In reaching its verdict, the jury also necessarily found that defendant's conduct

constituted a risk "of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitute^] a gross
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(3).
The evidence supports this finding. Defendant's claim to the contrary is inadequately
briefed. He merely claims that the evidence is insufficient and ambiguous and states that
"the record here supports that [Annie] was not in danger." Br. Appellant at 22. "When a
9

party fails to offer any meaningful analysis, [this Court will] decline to reach the merits."
State v. Garner, 2002 UT App 234, f 12, 69 P.3d 1278.
In any event, the record supports a finding that Annie was in danger. Defendant
repeatedly aimed his truck in her direction and accelerated rapidly, slamming on the
brakes at the last minute. R131:133-39. At least twice, he came within inches of striking
her. Id. at 138-39. While defendant may argue otherwise, this evidence supports both
the jury's finding that his conduct created a substantial and unjustifiable risk of causing
Annie death or serious bodily injury and its finding that his conduct constituted a gross
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise.
Defendant claims that evidence of Annie's fear was insufficient to support a
finding of a substantial risk. Id. at 23. In claiming that Annie's fear was insufficient to
support a finding of a substantial risk, defendant merely creates and attacks a straw man.
The "magnitude of the risk" is an objective inquiry. Robinson, 2003 UT App 1 at f 6
(citing State v. Wessendorf, 111 P.2d 523, 526 (Utah App. 1989)). The issue is not
whether Annie believed the risk to be substantial or even whether defendant believed the
risk to be substantial. The issue is whether the use of a truck as a projectile against an
unprotected pedestrian is a risk "'of such a degree that an ordinary person would not
disregard . .. it.'" Id (quoting State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142, 148 (Utah 1983)). Moreover,
there need be no showing of actual physical harm or even extremely dangerous conduct
by a defendant. See United States v. Jimenez, 323 F.3d 320, 323 (5th Cir. 2003). Rather,
it is the creation of a substantial risk of serious injury that supports a conviction for
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reckless endangerment. Id. (noting that leading police on high speed chase of itself
supports finding of reckless endangerment).
Ordinary people understand that trucks and cars are dangerous machines.
Ordinary people do not aim trucks and cars at pedestrians, speeding toward them and
then slamming on the brakes at the last minute. The jury properly determined that the
risk created by defendant's behavior was a risk so substantial that an ordinary person
would not disregard it.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.

2

Utah courts have dealt with gross deviations from the standard of care in a
number of cases, mostly in the context of manslaughter convictions and negligent
homicide cases. Those cases have involved various risks: placing a rattlesnake on a
child's shoulder, State v. Wessendorf, 111 P.2d 523 (Utah App. 1989) (manslaughter);
failing to hospitalize a home-delivered premature baby showing signs or respiratory
distress syndrome, State v. Warden, 813 P.2d 1146 (Utah 1991) (negligent homicide);
shooting at police dogs where shots could easily have reached an occupied building, State
v. Singer, 815 P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1991) (manslaughter); and using the palm to strike
an infant in the chest with adult force, State v. Morgan, 865 P.2d 1377 (Utah App. 1993)
(manslaughter).
While Utah appellate courts have hot addressed the risk associated with the use of
an automobile as a projectile, appellate courts in other jurisdictions have upheld jury
determinations that such a risk is substantial and unjustifiable and that it constitutes a
gross deviation from the standard of care an ordinary person would use. See, e.g., State v.
Hazeltine, 2004 WL 1114587 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004) (memorandum decision)
(attached in Addendum) (upholding conviction for reckless endangerment where angry
defendant drove car toward others in parking lot, but stopped shortly before hitting them).
11
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Not Reported in S.W.3d
2004 WL 1114587 (Tenn.Crim.App.)
(Cite as: 2004 WL 1114587 (Tenn.Crim.App.))

cOnly the Westlaw citation is currently available.
SEE RULE 19 OF THE RULES OF THE COURT
OF CRIMINAL APPEALS RELATING TO
PUBLICATION OF OPINIONS AND CITATION
OF UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee,
at Nashville.
STATE of Tennessee
v.
Shawn Edward HAZELTINE.
No. M2003-01292-CCA-R3-CD.
Assigned on Briefs April 6, 2004.
May 17,2004.
Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Marshall
County; No. 15272; Charles Lee, Judge.
Hayley E. Fults, Shelbyville, Tennessee (on appeal)
and Andrew Hoover. Pulaski, Tennessee (at trial) for
the appellant, Shawn Edward Hazeltine.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; J.
Ross Dyer, Assistant Attorney General; William
Michael McCown, District Attorney General;
Weakley E. Barnard, Assistant District Attorney
General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER. J., delivered the
opinion of the court, in which GARY R WADE. P.J.
and ALAN E. GLENN. J., joined.
OPINION
ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER. J.
*1A Marshall County jury convicted the Defendant,
Shawn Edward Hazeltine, of three counts of
aggravated assault and three counts of reckless
endangerment. The trial court merged the reckless
endangerment convictions with the aggravated
assault convictions and then sentenced the Defendant
to an aggregate seven years and seven months in
prison. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1)
insufficient evidence exists to support the
convictions; (2) the trial court erred in not
consolidating the three counts of reckless
endangerment; and (3) the trial court erred by not

ordering alternative sentencing and by ordering
consecutive sentencing. We conclude that sufficient
evidence exists in the record to support the
Defendant's convictions and that the trial court did
not err in sentencing the Defendant. However, we
conclude that the trial court erred by failing to
consolidate the three reckless endangerment
convictions into one conviction. We further conclude
that the trial court erred by entering a judgment form
for Count 2 showing a conviction for reckless
aggravated assault, because the trial court dismissed
Count 2 of the indictment. Therefore, we remand the
case to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
I. Facts
This case arises from an incident that occurred
during the early morning hours of November 3, 2002,
in the parking lot of a bar located in Marshall County.
The Defendant, angry from altercations in the bar and
the parking lot, drove his car toward the manager of
the bar and another man and stopped shortly before
hitting them. The Defendant then backed his car up,
drove toward the men again and hit Martie
Gottschalk, a designated driver who had just left the
bar. A jury convicted the Defendant of three counts
of aggravated assault and three counts of reckless
endangerment. The trial court merged the reckless
endangerment convictions with the aggravated
assault convictions and then sentenced the Defendant
to an aggregate seven years and seven months in
prison. The Defendant now appeals.
A. Trial
The following evidence was presented at the
Defendant's trial. Keith Jolley, a deputy with the
Marshall County Sheriffs Department, testified that
he responded to a call to assist a person at Big Jim's
Country, a bar located on Highway 50 in Marshall
County, on November 3, 2002, at 2:11 a.m. Deputy
Jolley stated that he saw a woman named Martie
Gottschalk lying on the ground in the gravel parking
lot of the bar, and then the paramedics arrived and
took her to the hospital. He explained that he asked
witnesses at the scene what had happened and
learned that a car struck Gottschalk in the parking lot.
The deputy testified that the Defendant's brother, Les
Hazeltine, told him that the Defendant's car hit
Gottschalk and then gave him a description of the
car. The deputy confirmed that the car's license plate
was registered to the Defendant. Deputy Jolley stated
that he contacted his dispatcher and requested that an

© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

Not Reported in S.W.3d
2004 WL 1114587 (Tenn.Crim.App.)
(Cite as: 2004 WL 1114587 (Tenn.Crim.App.))
alert be put out for the Defendant's red Ford Escort.
*2 Betty Prince, a bartender and cook at Big Jim's
Country, testified that she tended the bar in the early
morning hours of November 3, 2002, and stayed until
closing. She testified that she observed the Defendant
playing pool that evening. Betty Prince explained
that, as she was cleaning up the bar at about 1:45
a.m., the Defendant threw a beer bottle at the bar cash
register and it almost hit her. She reported that she
immediately called for security to escort the
Defendant out of the bar, stating, "Grab him. He
threw a beer bottle." She explained that, after
throwing the beer bottle, the Defendant walked
swiftly toward the door of the bar because "[h]e
want[ed] to get out of there." Betty Prince testified
that her son, Jerry Prince, was the manager of the bar
that night and he followed the Defendant out of the
bar. She stated that she did not leave the bar area
after calling for security and did not see what
happened in the parking lot.
Kelly Clark, a bartender at Big Jim's Country,
testified that she tended the bar with Betty Prince
during the early morning hours of November 3, 2002.
Clark stated that she served the Defendant a drink in
the pool room, and he made a pass at her. She
reported that she saw the Defendant throw a beer
bottle toward the bar and then saw him walk toward
the exit. She explained, "He hesitated going toward
the door, looking back to see if the other two
gentlemen that he had thrown the beer bottle at [were
going] to take off after him...." Clark testified that
Jerry Prince followed the Defendant outside into the
parking lot.
Jerry Prince, the manager of Big Jim's Country,
testified that he supervised security during the early
morning hours of November 3, 2002. He explained
that, as security at the bar, it was his duty to decide
whether trouble-makers in the bar should leave the
premises. He stated that he saw the Defendant near
the bar earlier that evening but did not see the
Defendant throw the beer bottle. Jerry Prince
explained that, at around 2:00 a.m., he heard a beer
bottle shatter, and then his mother, Betty Prince,
pointed at the Defendant and yelled, "He threw
something." He stated that he then saw the Defendant
running out the front door. Jerry Prince testified that
he ran after the Defendant and stopped him in the
parking lot next to the bar. He testified that a group
of men came out of the bar and into the parking lot
with him, including Donnie Locke, Beau Schillig and
Marty Parrish. He stated that he asked the Defendant
why he threw the beer bottle, and the Defendant

Page 2

replied, "They called me a queer." Jerry Prince
reported that he told the Defendant that he almost hit
his mother, Betty Prince, with the beer bottle and
then told him, "Get in your car and just leave." He
stated that, after he told the Defendant to leave, the
Defendant "got mad and ... jumped in his car." Jerry
Prince reported that the Defendant's car was a red
Ford Escort. He explained, "After [the Defendant] got
in the car, he started the car up, rolled the window
down, and said, 'I will get you guys.' " Jerry Prince
stated that the Defendant was looking at him and
Schillig when he made that statement. He stated that
he replied to the Defendant, "Just get out of here."
*3 Jerry Prince testified that the Defendant then
"[took] off spinning [his] tires, and [made] a big
turn, spinning [his] tires." He explained that the
Defendant "made a donut" in the parking lot and then
accelerated toward him and Schillig. Jerry Prince
testified that the Defendant's car was accelerating and
throwing gravel as he drove toward them and then
stopped a few inches away from Schillig and "about
ten or fifteen feet" from him.
Jerry Prince explained that the Defendant then
backed his car up about twenty-five feet and then
"came at us again, spinning [his] tires." He stated that
he and Schillig moved closer to the cars to be "a little
safer." Jerry Prince explained, "When he started
coming at us the second time, I saw [Schillig] coming
off of the ... left-hand ... passenger side.... And then
he kept on coming. And then I saw [Gottschalk]. I
didn't know it was [Gottschalk] at first. I saw
somebody coming off the hood of the car...." He
stated that the closest the Defendant's car came to
him the second time was seven to ten feet because "I
moved away from it, towards the line of cars that
were parked." He said that both times the Defendant's
car came toward him, he feared that he was going to
be injured. Jerry Prince explained that, after the car
passed him and Schillig, the Defendant's car traveled
another ten to fifteen feet and he "saw somebody
coming off of the hood." He said that the Defendant
was looking straight ahead as he drove his car toward
him and Schillig the second time. He stated that, after
the Defendant hit Gottschalk, the Defendant stopped
his car, backed up and started to drive away. Jerry
Prince stated that he then ran after the car because
"[the Defendant] just hit somebody in my parking
lot." He testified that he attempted to open the
passenger door to the Defendant's car, but the door
was locked. He explained, "As the car started leaving,
I kicked the [passenger] side of the car." He said that
he kicked the Defendant's car to mark it "so they
could find it later." He stated that the Defendant's car
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was "spinning gravel" when he left the parking lot.
He said that he got a partial license plate number
from the Defendant's car as it drove away.
Jerry Prince testified that, after the Defendant drove
away, he checked on Gottschalk, who was lying on
the ground. He said that she was "screaming that her
legs had been broke[n]...." He stated that several
people were assisting Gottschalk in the parking lot,
including her brother and Schillig. Jerry Prince
testified that he then called the ambulance and the
police about the incident. He said that the police
questioned him about the incident a few days later.
Beau Schillig testified that he arrived at his brother's
engagement party at Big Jim's Country on the
evening of November 2, 2002, at around 8:30 p.m.
and stayed until bar closed the next morning. He
stated that he saw the Defendant at the bar during the
night, but he did not know him. Schillig said that,
while he was playing pool in the early morning hours
of November 3, 2002, he saw the Defendant pick up
a beer bottle and throw it across the counter of the
bar, hitting a neon sign and a cash register. He stated
that the Defendant ran out the front door of the bar
after he threw the beer bottle. He testified that he
heard a lady at the bar yell, "Somebody threw a beer
bottle," and then he saw Jerry Prince follow the
Defendant out of the bar. Schillig testified that he
went outside the bar to check on Jerry Prince and to
see whether he needed assistance with the Defendant.
He explained that he "[w]ent out there to help [Jerry
Prince] calm the [Defendant] down." He said that he
stood next to Jerry Prince as Prince asked the
Defendant to leave, and the Defendant got into his
car. Schillig stated that the Defendant "looked like he
was going out [of the parking lot], and he ended up
coming towards us." He reported that, as the
Defendant came toward them in his car, "we trfied] to
get out of the way." He said that the Defendant's car
came within two inches of hitting him and he may
have "scraped by it." Schillig testified that the
Defendant was "[s]pinning [his] tires and acted like
he wanted to hit us." He explained that the Defendant
was "coming at us pretty fast," and he was concerned
that he might get injured if the Defendant hit him
with the car.
*4 Schillig said that, after the Defendant stopped his
car, he "put[ ] it in reverse and [took] off backwards"
about ten feet. He stated that the Defendant then
drove toward Jerry Prince and him again, with his
tires spinning and "throwing gravel everywhere." He
said that the Defendant's car came within two feet of
him on the Defendant's second attempt to hit him,
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and he had to move out of the way to avoid getting
hit. Schillig testified that he was scared that he would
be injured if the Defendant hit him, so he jumped out
of the way of the car. He stated that he heard Jerry
Prince kick the Defendant's car as it was leaving the
parking lot. Schillig stated that he did not see the
Defendant's car hit Gottschalk, but after the
Defendant sped off and left the parking lot he
realized that she had been hit. He explained, "I got
down there and was asking [Gottschalk] if she was
okay, and just trying to get her to calm down.
[I][s]tayed over there with her until the ambulance
got there." Schillig said that Gottschalk appeared to
be in pain and was "yelling and screaming [that] her
legs hurt." He explained that Gottschalk was his
designated driver and was "going to [drive] me
home."
Martie Gottschalk testified that she attended an
engagement party for Schillig's brother at Big Jim's
Country on the evening of November 2, 2002. She
stated that she agreed to be the designated driver for
Schillig because "he had been drinking a little bit and
[Schillig's parents] didn't want him driving...." She
said that, during the early morning hours of
November 3, 2002, "[tjhere was a fight or
confrontation inside. I was on the other side [of the
bar]. And somebody said that [Schillig] had gotten
thrown out." Gottschalk explained that she went
outside to get Schillig "because we had to [drive] him
home." She testified, "I went out the front door and
turned back to my left and went back toward the back
[of the building]. Back there I could see there was a
crowd ... and I assumed it was [Schillig]. And I just
went toward them to go get him." Gottschalk
explained that she walked past two rows of cars and
"then the next thing I know is I[saw] headlights." She
said that the car was coming at her fast and she
"didn't have time to think." She stated that she could
not remember the car hitting her and realized that she
was on the ground in the parking lot. She explained,
"I must have blacked out because when I woke up, I
was in the ambulance." She said that her right knee
"was hurting pretty good. They told me that I had
been hit." Gottschalk testified that, in addition to her
knee, her stomach was sore from being hit by the car.
She stated that the ambulance took her to the hospital
for treatment. She explained that she had to wear a
strap-on cast on her right leg for about three weeks
and had to use crutches during that time. Gottschalk
said that she no longer has any problems with her
knee.
Ryan Derryberry, Gottschalk's older brother,
testified that he attended the engagement party with
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Gottschalk at Big Jim's Country on the evening of
November 2, 2002. He stated that he followed
Gottschalk outside into the parking lot at around 2:00
a.m. on November 3, 2002, because "I knew there
was some trouble starting." He explained that she was
about fifty yards in front of him in the parking lot.
Derryberry stated that he suddenly saw Gottschalk in
the headlights of a car, and then the car hit her. He
said that he caught a glimpse of a "reddish-maroonish
car" backing up, and then ran directly to Gottschalk,
who was lying in the parking lot. He explained that
she was "on the ground, screaming in pain," so he
held her and placed his sweater underneath her head.
He said that he followed her to the hospital and then
brought her home.
*5 Marty Parrish testified that he was at Big Jim's
Country during the early morning hours of November
3, 2002, and witnessed Gottschalk being hit by a car.
He said that he went outside because he saw
"everybody going toward the door, and I knew
something was going on, so I went out there." He
stated that, when the car hit her, she "went on the
hood ... [a]nd then he slammed on the brakes, and she
fell off on the ground." Parrish said that, after hitting
Gottschalk, the driver "put it in reverse and backed
up and took off." He reported that the car that hit
Gottschalk was a red Ford Escort. He stated that he
wrote the license plate number on his hand and then
gave it to the police when they arrived at the scene.
The Defendant testified that he arrived at Big Jim's
Country at about 10:00 p.m. on November 2, 2002,
with his brother and his brother's wife to celebrate
their anniversary. He stated that he had about five or
six beers over the course of the evening. The
Defendant reported that, while he was sitting with his
brother near the pool tables, a man playing pool said
to the Defendant, "What are you, some kind of
queer?" He explained, "I was kind of mad about it so
I picked up a beer bottle. Yes, I did throw a beer
bottle.... It was stupid of me to do [it]. I should have
never [done] it. [I][t]hen proceeded to run out of the
bar." The Defendant stated that he ran out of the bar
"because I knew I had made a bad mistake, and I was
more than likely going to get in trouble for it, so I just
wanted to leave." He testified that, as he ran out to his
car, Jerry Prince was running after him. The
Defendant said that he unlocked his car, got inside
and then locked the car. He explained that Jerry
Prince "was not a happy person. He was mad. I knew
he was trying to come after me. I didn't know at the
time that the beer bottle had almost hit his mother,
and I am very sorry for that.... I was just trying to get
out of there." The Defendant explained that he could
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not understand what Jerry Prince was yelling at him
in the parking lot. The Defendant said that he would
have stayed at the bar and apologized for throwing
the beer bottle if he had known that it almost hit
Betty Prince.
The Defendant testified that, as he was backing up
his car, Jerry Prince attempted to open his car doors
on the driver's side and then on the passenger's side.
The Defendant said that Jerry Prince kicked his car as
he drove away. He explained, "I didn't see Ms.
Gottschalk out there.... I did not hit [anybody]. If I
did [hit somebody,] I would have stopped. I am not
that kind of person. I would [not] have just ... run
somebody down and [then left] them there." The
Defendant said, "If [Gottschalk] was hit by my
vehicle, I never knew it. I had no idea. And that is
why I just proceeded to leave." The Defendant
testified that Jerry Prince stood in front of his car at
one point, and he backed the car awayfromhim in an
attempt to leave. The Defendant denied using his car
as a weapon against Jerry Prince and Schillig, stating,
"I have never intentionally tried to run anybody
down." He explained, "I just wanted to leave the bar,
and I didn't want to get in [any] trouble. That is all I
wanted to do." He denied "cutting donuts" in the
parking lot because "if anybody knows anything
about afront-wheeldrive car, you cannot cut a donut
in it. I wasn't sliding around." The Defendant also
denied telling Jerry Prince, "I am going to get you."
He stated that he kept his windows rolled up and did
not say anything to Jerry Prince or anyone else.
*6 The Defendant testified that, as he drove through
the parking lot to leave, "I was kind of going a little
bit fast, but I wasn't going that fast. I mean, I didn't
have ... the accelerator pushed all of the way down to
the floor." He stated that he believed that he did not
hit anybody that night. He explained, "I know [I]
made a mistake throwing the beer bottle, but I did not
knowingly and intentionally try to run somebody
down out there in that parking lot, especially a
woman. I wouldn't even raise my hand to a woman,
much less try to run her down with a car."
On cross-examination, the Defendant admitted that
he was convicted of aggravated burglary and theft on
February 20, 1997. He denied hitting Gottschalk in
the parking lot with his car. The Defendant stated
that, at the bar, he "had a buzz," and he was mad at
the two men at the pool tables because they called
him a "queer," so he threw a beer bottle at them. The
Defendant explained that he wanted to hit them with
the beer bottle, and he admitted that he committed a
crime by throwing the bottle at the men. He stated
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that he waited until he was on the other side of the
bar to throw the beer bottle. The Defendant said that
he did not try to run over Jerry Prince and Schillig
and did not threaten them in any way. He stated that
he was not "spinning gravel" as he left the parking
lot. He testified that he looked out of the windshield
as he drove his car forward in the parking lot and
never saw Gottschalk.
Before submitting the case to the jury, the trial court
dismissed Count 2 of the indictment, which charged
the Defendant with aggravated assault for placing
Gottschalk in reasonable fear of imminent bodily
injury through the use or display of a deadly weapon.
Thereafter, the jury convicted the Defendant of one
count of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D
felony, two counts of intentional or knowing
aggravated assault, Class C felonies, and three counts
of reckless endangerment, Class E felonies.
B. Sentencing Hearing
The following evidence was presented at the
Defendant's sentencing hearing. The State introduced
the Defendant's pre-sentence report into evidence.
Jim Grimes, a supervisor in the probation and parole
department for the State of Tennessee, testified that
the Defendant had twelve prior misdemeanor
convictions and one felony conviction in Giles
County between 1994 and 1999. Grimes stated that
the Defendant had been placed on probation
approximately ten times during that time period, and
the Defendant had a total of three revocation warrants
"that were filed against him and sustained." He
testified that the Defendant had failed to pay $2,598
in "balance dues" for his misdemeanor cases in Giles
County. Grimes stated that the victim asked for
$1,000 in restitution for her injuries. He testified that
the Defendant had been convicted of assault on two
previous occasions. Grimes said that the Defendant
reported a history of drinking alcohol and using
marijuana and crack cocaine. On cross-examination,
Grimes stated that the victims in the Defendant's case
showed little interest in the Defendant's sentencing.
He testified that the Defendant expressed remorse for
hitting Gottschalk in the parking lot.
*7 James Edward Hazeltine, the Defendant's father,
testified that the Defendant had an alcohol problem
when he was younger. He stated that he put the
Defendant in a rehabilitation center in Knoxville,
and, when the Defendant returned home, "He was
doing a lot better...." James Hazeltine testified that
the Defendant has lived with him for most of the
Defendant's life. He said that the Defendant worked
for Valley Packaging in Pulaski in November of

2002. He explained that the Defendant "was moving
right along up the ladder there." James Hazeltine
reported that the Defendant has not been convicted of
any crimes from 1999 to the present. He testified that,
if the trial court placed the Defendant on probation,
the Defendant would reside at his house.
Tracy Mitchell, the Defendant's sister, testified that
the Defendant "baby-sits for me any time I work
during the weekends, when he is off work." She said
that she has no hesitation about leaving her child
alone with the Defendant. Les Hazeltine, the
Defendant's brother, testified that the Defendant went
to drug and alcohol rehabilitation and turned his life
around. He explained, "It was night and day. I mean,
when he got out [of rehabilitation], he got a good job.
He had a steady job, worked hard every day .... and
he was an upstanding citizen." Les Hazeltine said
that, if the Defendant was placed on probation, he
was certain that the Defendant would follow all of the
requirements of probation. On cross-examination, he
testified that he accompanied the Defendant to Big
Jim's Country on November 2, 2002. Les Hazeltine
stated that the Defendant was not drunk, but he had
"a good buzz going" at the bar.
Following the presentation of this evidence, the trial
court merged the three reckless endangerment
convictions with the corresponding three aggravated
assault convictions for each victim. The record shows
that the trial court included an additional judgment
form for Count 2, reckless aggravated assault, with
the notation, "Merge with Count One," even though
the trial court dismissed Count 2 before submitting
the case to the jury.
After considering the evidence presented at the
sentencing hearing, the trial court found the
following enhancement factors to be applicable to the
Defendant's convictions pursuant to Tennessee Code
Annotated section 40-35- 114 f 1997 & Supp.2002):
(2) The defendant has a previous history of
criminal convictions or criminal behavior in
addition to those necessary to establish the
appropriate range;...
(9) The defendant has a previous history of
unwillingness to comply with the conditions of a
sentence involving release in the community; ...
[and]
(17) The crime was committed
under
circumstances under which the potential for bodily
injury to a victim was great...
The trial court found that no mitigating factors
applied to the Defendant's case. The trial court then
determined that consecutive sentencing was
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appropriate under Tennessee Code Annotated section
40-35-115(b)(2) 0997 & Supp.2002) because it
found that the Defendant "is an offender whose
record of criminal activity is extensive." Thereafter,
the trial court imposed the following sentences: two
years and nine months for reckless aggravated
assault; and four years and ten months for each
remaining conviction of aggravated assault, to be
served concurrently with each other, but
consecutively to the sentence for reckless aggravated
assault. The trial court then denied the Defendant's
request for alternative sentencing, finding that the
Defendant was not a good candidate for alternative
sentencing "because of the numerous times that the
[Defendant has been placed on probation ... and the
revocations which he suffered in the past." The trial
court further found that alternative sentencing was
not appropriate because of "the [Defendant's past
failures at rehabilitation, and apparently his present
failure at rehabilitation." The Defendant now appeals.
II. Analysis
*8 On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1)
insufficient evidence exists to support his
convictions; (2) the trial court erred in not
consolidating the three counts of reckless
endangerment; and (3) the trial court erred by not
ordering alternative sentencing and by ordering
consecutive sentencing.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
First, the Defendant contends that the evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to support his
convictions for aggravated assault and reckless
endangerment. When an accused challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court's
standard of review is whether, after considering the
evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. Term. R.App. P. 13(e): Jackson v.
Virginia. 443 U.S. 307. 324 (1979): State v. Smith. 24
S.W.3d 274, 278 (Tenn.2000). This rule applies to
findings of guilt based upon direct evidence,
circumstantial evidence, or a combination of both
direct and circumstantial evidence. State v.
Penderzrass,
13
S.W.3d
389,
392-93
(Tenn.Crim.App. 1999).
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, this
Court should not re-weigh or re-evaluate the
evidence. State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 779
(Tenn.Crim.App. 1990). Nor may this Court substitute
its inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact from
the evidence. State v. Buggs. 995 S.W.2d 102, 105
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(Tenn.1999): Liakas v. State, 286 S.W.2d 856. 859
(Tenn.1956). Questions concerning the credibility of
the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence,
as well as all factual issues raised by the evidence are
resolved by the trier of fact. Liakas. 286 S.W.2d at
859. This Court must afford the State of Tennessee
the strongest legitimate view of the evidence
contained in the record, as well as all reasonable
inferences which may be drawn from the evidence.
State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn.1992).
Because a verdict of guilt against a defendant
removes the presumption of innocence and raises a
presumption of guilt, the convicted criminal
defendant bears the burden of showing that the
evidence was legally insufficient to sustain a guilty
verdict. Id.
1. Aggravated Assault
A person commits aggravated assault who:
(1) Intentionally or knowingly commits an assault
as defined in § 39-13-101 and:
(A) Causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(B) Uses or displays a deadly weapon; or
(2) Recklessly commits an assault as defined in §
39-13-101(a)(l),and:
(A) Causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(B) Uses or displays a deadly weapon.
Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-102(a)(l), (2) (1997 &
Supp.2002). Tennessee Code Annotated section 3913-101(a)(1997) states that a person commits assault
who: "(1) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly
causes bodily injury to another; (2) Intentionally or
knowingly causes another to reasonably fear
imminent bodily injury; or (3) Intentionally or
knowingly causes physical contact with another and a
reasonable person would regard the contact as
extremely offensive or provocative." "Deadly
weapon" means "[a]nything that in the manner of its
use or intended use is capable of causing death or
serious bodily injury." Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11106(a)(5)(B) (1997). "Bodily injury" includes "a cut,
abrasion, bruise, burn or disfigurement; physical pain
or temporary illness or impairment of the function of
a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty."
Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-106(a)(2).
*9 In this case, the Defendant was convicted for
reckless aggravated assault for recklessly causing
bodily injury to Gottschalk while using a deadly
weapon. The Defendant also was convicted for two
counts of aggravated assault for intentionally or
knowingly causing Jerry Prince and Schillig to
reasonably fear imminent bodily injury while using a
deadly weapon. Viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, the proof showed
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that the Defendant got into his car in the parking lot
and told Jerry Prince, "I will get you guys." The
Defendant then "cut a donut" in the parking lot and
then "spun gravel" as he accelerated toward Jerry
Prince and Schillig. The Defendant's car stopped a
few inches from Schillig, and then the Defendant
backed his car up about twenty-five feet in the
parking lot. The Defendant then "spun gravel" again
as he accelerated toward Jerry Prince and Schillig a
second time. Jerry Prince and Schillig managed to
dodge the Defendant's car, but the Defendant hit
Gottschalk as she was crossing the parking lot,
causing Gottschalk severe pain in her right leg and
requiring her to wear a strap-on cast for about three
weeks. Jerry Prince and Schillig testified that they
feared bodily injury as the Defendant drove toward
them on both occasions. The "deadly weapon" in this
case was the Defendant's car, which was capable of
causing death or serious bodily injury if it were to hit
a person. Based upon this evidence, we conclude that
a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the Defendant committed reckless
aggravated assault against Gottschalk and aggravated
assault against Jerry Prince and Schillig.
2. Reckless Endangerment
A person commits reckless endangerment "who
recklessly engages in conduct which places or may
place another person in imminent danger of death or
serious bodily injury." Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13103(a) (1997). Reckless endangerment committed
with a deadly weapon is a Class E felony. Tenn.Code
Ann. § 39-13- 103(b). "Reckless" refers to a person
"who acts recklessly with respect to circumstances
surrounding the conduct or the result of the conduct
when the person is aware of but consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur."
Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-ll-106fa)(31). The risk "must
be of such a nature and degree that its disregard
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of
care that an ordinary person would exercise under all
the circumstances as viewed from the accused
person's standpoint." Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13103(a)(31).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, the evidence shows that the Defendant
recklessly drove his vehicle at a high rate of speed in
the parking lot of Big Jim's Country, thereby placing
other people in the parking lot in imminent danger of
death or serious bodily injury. The Defendant almost
hit Jerry Prince and Schillig and struck Gottschalk
during the course of his reckless driving in the
parking lot. Thus, the evidence was sufficient for the
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jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the
Defendant was guilty of recklessly endangering
Gottschalk, Jerry Prince and Schillig. However,
because of our holding with respect to the
Defendant's second issue, we reverse the trial court's
judgments for Counts 5 and 7 showing the
convictions of reckless endangerment upon Jerry
Prince and Schillig.
B. Consolidation of Reckless Endangerment
Convictions
*10 The Defendant next contends that the trial court
erred in not consolidating the three counts of reckless
endangerment since they arose from the Defendant's
single act of driving. The State concedes in its
appellate brief that the Defendant's convictions for
reckless endangerment upon Jerry Prince and Schillig
must be merged into a single count, but the State
argues that the conviction for reckless endangerment
upon Gottschalk must stand. The State contends that
the Defendant committed two separate acts of
reckless endangerment in the parking lot because he
drove toward Jerry Prince and Schillig, backed up
and then drove at them again, hitting Gottschalk. We
agree with the Defendant.
In State v. Ramsey. 903 S.W.2d 709, 713
(Tenn.Crim.App. 1995), this Court held that, in
certain circumstances, a defendant's continuous
operation of a vehicle may only result in one act of
reckless endangerment under the statute. This Court
noted that "the fact that the reckless endangerment
statute speaks in terms of a person recklessly
engaging in conduct indicates that a course of
conduct, comprised of several acts, would constitute
the offense." Ramsey, 903 S.W.2d at 713; see also
State v. Davis. 654 S.W.2d 688, 696
(Tenn.Crim.App. 1983) (holding that if the statute
prohibits a course of conduct, as opposed to
individual acts, then there can be only one conviction
even though several acts constituting the course of
conduct may be proven). However, this Court
declined to "fashion a blanket rule that provides that a
defendant's continuous operation of a vehicle may
only result in one act of reckless endangerment under
the statute. Many scenarios could be created where
such a rule would not be prudent." Ramsey, 903
S.W.2d at 713. Instead, the determination of whether
the continuous operation of a vehicle may constitute
one act of reckless endangerment depends upon the
unique facts of each case. Id
In Ramsey, the defendant was speeding in his car
along a two lane road and veered into the oncoming
lane, nearly hitting a pick-up truck traveling in that
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lane. Id at 711. The defendant continued speeding
and veered into the oncoming lane again, colliding
with a second pick-up truck. Id The defendant was
convicted of three counts of reckless endangerment
for three separate victims. Id. This Court determined
that, under those facts, the trial court should have
merged the three counts of reckless endangerment
into one. This Court explained:
Due to the very short distance between the two
trucks and the very short amount of time that
passed between swerving into the oncoming lane of
traffic in front of the Tripletts and the crash with
Mr. Story, the reckless conduct engaged in by the
defendant was one continuous act, a single course
of conduct, and therefore supports only one
conviction for that act. In this case, ... we find that
although the defendant's reckless conduct
victimized more than one person, it does not justify
multiple convictions.
*HA£at713.
In this case, the evidence shows that the Defendant
"cut a donut" in the parking lot and then "spun
gravel" as he accelerated toward Jerry Prince and
Schillig. The Defendant's car stopped a few inches
from Schillig, and then the Defendant backed his car
up about twenty-five feet in the parking lot. The
Defendant then "spun gravel" again as he accelerated
toward Jerry Prince and Schillig a second time. Jerry
Prince and Schillig managed to dodge the
Defendant's car, but the Defendant hit Gottschalk as
she was crossing the parking lot. The facts of this
case are similar to the facts in Ramsey because these
events occurred during a very short period of time,
and the victims were within close physical proximity
of each other. We conclude that, under these facts,
the reckless conduct engaged in by the Defendant
was one continuous act, a single course of conduct,
and, therefore, supports only one conviction for that
act. Although the Defendant's reckless conduct
victimized more than one person, we conclude that it
does not justify multiple convictions. Accordingly,
we reverse the trial court's judgments for Counts 5
and 7 showing the convictions of reckless
endangerment upon Jerry Prince and Schillig.
After thoroughly examining the record in this case,
we also conclude that the trial court erred as to Count
2 by entering a judgment form for Count 2 showing a
conviction for reckless aggravated assault with the
notation, "Merge with Count One." Before the trial
court submitted the case to the jury, the trial court
dismissed Count 2 of the indictment. The jury
convicted the Defendant of one count of reckless
aggravated assault. Therefore, we remand the case to

Page 8

the trial court to enter an order vacating this
extraneous judgment pertaining to Count 2.
G. Sentencing
Finally, the Defendant contends that the trial court
erred in sentencing the Defendant. The trial court
imposed the following sentences: two years and nine
months for reckless aggravated assault; and four
years and ten months for each conviction of
aggravated assault, to be served concurrently with
each other, but consecutively to the sentence for
reckless aggravated assault. Specifically, the
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by
imposing consecutive sentencing and denying his
request for alternative sentencing. The State contends
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
ordering consecutive sentencing because the
Defendant has an extensive history of criminal
activity. The State also argues that the trial court
properly denied the Defendant's request for
alternative sentencing because the Defendant's
probation has been revoked more than once in the
past, and he has failed at his attempts to rehabilitate
himself. We agree with the State.
When a defendant challenges the length and manner
of service of a sentence, it is the duty of this court to
conduct a de novo review on the record with a
presumption that "the determinations made by the
court from which the appeal is taken are correct."
Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d) (2003). This
presumption is "conditioned upon the affirmative
showing in the record that the trial court considered
the sentencing principles and all relevant facts and
circumstances." State v. Ross. 49 S.W.3d 833, 847
(Tenn.200n: State v. Pettus. 986 S.W.2d 540, 543
(Tenn.1999): State v. Ashbv. 823 S.W.2d 166, 169
(Tenn.1990. The presumption does not apply to the
legal conclusions reached by the trial court in
sentencing a defendant or to the determinations made
by the trial court which are predicated upon
uncontroverted facts. State v. Dean. 76 S.W.3d 352,
377 (Tenn.Crim.App.200n; State v. Butler. 900
S.W.2d 305, 311 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1994): State v.
Smith 891 S.W.2d 922. 929 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1994).
In conducting a de novo review of a sentence, we
must consider: (a) any evidence received at the trial
and/or sentencing hearing; (b) the presentence report;
(c) the principles of sentencing; (d) the arguments of
counsel relative to sentencing alternatives; (e) the
nature and characteristics of the offense; (f) any
mitigating or enhancement factors; (g) any statements
made by the defendant on his or her own behalf; and
(h) the defendant's potential or lack of potential for
rehabilitation or treatment. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-
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210 (2003); State v. Taylor, 63 S.W.3d 400. 411
fTenn.CrimApp.2001). The party challenging a
sentence imposed by the trial court has the burden of
establishing that the sentence is erroneous.
Tenn.Code Ann. $
40-35-401. Sentencing
Commission Cmts.
*12 A defendant is eligible for alternative sentencing
if the sentence actually imposed is eight years or less.
Tenn.Code Ann. S
40-35- 303(a) (2003). A
defendant who is an especially mitigated or standard
offender convicted of a Class C, D or E felony is
presumed to be a favorable candidate for alternative
sentencing options in the absence of evidence to the
contrary. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-102(b)(6). In
determining whether to grant or deny probation, the
trial court may consider the following: the
circumstances of the offense; the defendant's criminal
record; background and social history; the
defendant's physical and mental health; the deterrent
effect on other criminal activity; and the likelihood
that probation is in the best interests of both the
public and the defendant. State v. Parker, 932 S.W.2d
945. 958 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1996). The Defendant
bears the burden of establishing suitability for
probation. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-303(b): Ashbv,
823S.W.2datl69.
Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-103(1)
(1997) states that:
Sentences involving confinement should be based
on the following considerations: (A) Confinement
is necessary to protect society by restraining a
defendant who has a long history of criminal
conduct; (B) Confinement is necessary to avoid
depreciating the seriousness of the offense or
confinement is particularly suited to provide an
effective deterrence to others likely to commit
similar offenses; or (C) Measures less restrictive
than confinement have frequently or recently been
applied unsuccessfully to the defendant;....
Additionally, "[t]he potential or lack of potential for
the rehabilitation or treatment of the defendant should
be considered in determining the sentence alternative
or length of a term to be imposed...." Tenn.Code Ann.
§ 40-35- 103(5). The trial court may consider
mitigating factors and enhancement factors when
determining a defendant's sentence. Tenn.Code Ann.
§ $ 40-35-113. - 114. A trial court may order
sentences to run consecutively if a defendant is
charged with more than one criminal offense and it
finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that one or
more of several criteria are met as set forth in
Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115
(1997). State v. Kern, 909 S.W.2d 5. 8
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(Tenn.Crim.App. 1993). These criteria include a
finding by the trial court that the defendant is "an
offender whose record of criminal activity is
extensive." Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(2).
Whether sentences are to be served consecutively or
concurrently is a matter within the sound discretion
of the trial court. State v. James, 688 S.W.2d 463.
465 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1984).
In this case, after considering the evidence presented
at the sentencing hearing, the trial court found the
following enhancement factors to be applicable to the
Defendant's convictions pursuant to Tennessee Code
Annotated section 40-35-114:
(2) The defendant has a previous history of
criminal convictions or criminal behavior in
addition to those necessary to establish the
appropriate range;...
*13 (9) The defendant has a previous history of
unwillingness to comply with the conditions of a
sentence involving release in the community; ...
[and]
(17) The crime was committed under
circumstances under which the potential for bodily
injury to a victim was great;...
The trial court found that no mitigating factors
applied to the Defendant's case. The trial court then
determined that consecutive sentencing was
appropriate under Tennessee Code Annotated section
40-35-115(b)(2) because it found that the Defendant
"is an offender whose record of criminal activity is
extensive." The trial court then denied the
Defendant's request for alternative sentencing,
finding that the Defendant was not a good candidate
for alternative sentencing "because of the numerous
times that the [Defendant has been placed on
probation ... and the revocations which he suffered in
the past." The trial court further found that alternative
sentencing was not appropriate because of "the
[Defendant's past failures at rehabilitation, and
apparently his present failure at rehabilitation."
On appeal, the Defendant does not contest the trial
court's imposition of any enhancement factors;
fFNll rather he challenges the imposition of
consecutive sentencing and the trial court's denial of
the Defendant's request for alternative sentencing.
After thoroughly reviewing the evidence presented at
the sentencing hearing, we conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by ordering
consecutive sentencing in this case. The record shows
that the Defendant is "an offender whose record of
criminal activity is extensive." Tenn.Code Ann. §
40-35-115(b)(2). The Defendant's record shows the
following convictions: evading arrest; leaving the
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scene of an accident; two convictions for disorderly
conduct; two convictions for public intoxication; two
convictions for vandalism; driving under the
influence; two convictions for assault; aggravated
burglary; and theft. These thirteen convictions
demonstrate that the Defendant has an extensive
record of criminal activity. Accordingly, we conclude
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
imposing consecutive sentencing in this case.
FN1. In his appellate brief, the Defendant
failed to argue any sentencing issues other
than whether the trial court
erred in ordering consecutive sentencing and
in denying the Defendant's request for
alternative sentencing. Accordingly, we
conclude that the Defendant has waived any
other sentencing issues. Tenn. R.App. P.
13(b); Tenn. R. Ct.Crim.App. 10(b).
However, we note that the trial court erred
by applying the enhancement factor that "the
crime was committed under circumstances
under which the potential for bodily injury
to a victim was great." Tenn.Code Ann. §
40-35-114(17). In State v. Imfeld 70 S.W.3d
698, 706 (Tenn.20021 the Tennessee
Supreme Court held that the "potential for
bodily injury" enhancement factor was
inapplicable to enhance the sentences for
aggravated assault because "elements of an
aggravated assault against a specific, named
victim are reflected in the statutory language
of the enhancement factor, thus rendering its
application to enhance the sentence
inappropriate." Even if we were to find that
this issue was not waived, the trial court's
error in applying this enhancement factor
would not have resulted in a reduction in the
Defendant's sentence because the trial court
properly applied the two other enhancement
factors.
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Defendant has been given the opportunity to
rehabilitate himself under less restrictive means, and
he has failed to take advantage of these opportunities.
His actions in the parking lot of Big Jim's Country
injured Gottschalk and could have seriously injured
other people in the area. Moreover, the Defendant's
extensive record of criminal activity indicates that he
is not a good candidate for alternative sentencing.
The record fully supports the trial court's findings and
its determination denying the Defendant an
alternative sentence. Therefore, we conclude that the
Defendant has not met his burden of demonstrating
the impropriety of the trial court's denial of
alternative sentencing.
III. Conclusion
*14 In accordance with the foregoing authorities and
reasoning, we AFFIRM the trial court's judgments for
Counts 1, 4 and 6, the aggravated assault convictions,
and for Count 3, the conviction of reckless
endangerment upon Gottschalk. We REVERSE the
trial court's judgments for Counts 5 and 7 showing
the convictions of reckless endangerment upon Jerry
Prince and Schillig. We REMAND the case to the
trial court to enter an order vacating the extraneous
judgment pertaining to Count 2 and for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
2004 WL 1114587 (Tenn.Crim.App.)
END OF DOCUMENT

The Defendant next contends that the trial court
erred by denying his request for alternative
sentencing. The trial court found that the Defendant
was not a good candidate for probation because of his
prior probation revocations and his past failures at
rehabilitation. The trial court noted that the
Defendant
"faltered
considerably"
in his
rehabilitation on the night of the incident and "[t]hat
almost caused at least one ... person to be seriously,
seriously injured, who [did not have a] dog in the
fight, so to speak. She was just going to her car, and
the [Defendant recklessly ran over her because of
this." We agree with the trial court's findings. The
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